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Introduction

I

t seems one has to accept as inevitable that when something useful for the
improvement of man's life has been invented, thoughts will either tum to
how to weaponize or destroy it, or, in the case of computer network technology, both.
The task of the international lawyer in the face of a new weapon or intended
military activity is to establish how existing law applies and with what effect.
Would existing law prohibit the weapon or activity or restrict it in any particular
way? Would it be appropriate, for one or more policy reasons, to impose prohibitions or restrictions that do not already apply? Might it be the case, on the contrary, that the new weapon or method might be an improvement from both a
policy and humanitarian point of view?
The purpose of this short chapter is to explore certain aspects of how computer network attack (CNA) could be affected by international humanitarian
law (IHL), including the law of neutrality, based on the knowledge generally
available so far on the military possibilities presented by computer networks. It
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may be that these possibilities are overstated, but the chapter will base itself on
the premise that a variety of the indicated effects would be possible.

Applicability of the International Law of Armed Conflict (International
Humanitarian Lawr
It is perfectly reasonable to assume that CNA is subject to IHL just as any new
weapon or delivery system has been so far when used in an armed conflict. The
only real difficulty in this regard would arise if the first, or only, "hostile" acts
were conducted by these means. Would this amount to an armed conflict within
the meaning of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other IHL treaties? This
question is close to, but not necessarily identical with, whether the behavior
amounts to an armed attack within the meaning ofArticle 2(4) of the UN Charter. The ICRC Commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions indicates that in
the case of a cross-border operation, the first shot suffices to create an international armed conflict, 2 which can therefore be of very short duration. 3 There
are, ofcourse, other views which would require a threshold ofintensity or time, 4
but this approach would lead to the need for evaluations that would create inevitable uncertainties and ultimately to the same problems faced when establishing
whether "war" existed without a formal declaration; this issue led to the abandonment for the need for a "war" for the "law ofwar" to apply. The problem is
still with us, however, in non-international armed conflicts where there remain
many cases of uncertainty (or denial) as to whether the threshold and nature of
violence has reached that of an armed conflict, rather than "just" internal violence requiring "police" operations. 5 If the first or only "hostilities" that occur
in a non-international situation were computer network attacks, the degree of
doubt would be even greater.
The problem is, ofcourse, that so far hostilities have involved weapons which
launch projectiles, or other types of energy transfer, that lead to visible physical
damage. In the case ofIHL, the motivation for the application of the law is to
limit the damage and provide care for the casualties. This would militate in favor
of an expansive interpretation of when IHL begins to apply. The likelihood of
this threshold being linked with the perception that an armed attack within the
meaning of Article 2(4) has occurred in the case of a cross-border CNA is, of
course, high, given the historical development of the jus ad bellum and thejtls itl
bello. This would not be problematic if it had a restraining effect on the commencement of hostilities through CNA, either because of the Article 2(4) prohibition, or because the Security Council decided the CNA amounted to a
threat to the peace and dealt with it in a way that avoided more damage.
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However, the danger lies in the possibility of the CNA being perceived as an
anned attack justifYing measures of self-defence, for such a characterization
might escalate the situation further than would otherwise have been the case.
Whether or not these linkages occur, there is an argument to be made in favor of
the implementation ofIHL when CNA is undertaken by official sources and is
intended to, or does, result in physical damage to persons, or damage to objects
that goes beyond the bit of computer program or data attacked. CNA alone in
non-international contexts is even more problematic-it is far more likely to be
seen solely as criminal behavior, although the potential for damage could be
enonnous and the groups undertaking this could be at least as well organized as
"anned" groups. Once "nonnal" weapons are used, there is no problem at all.
CNA will be an attack (in the sense of the jus in bello) as any other. Whether
CNA alone will ever come to be seen as amounting to an anned conflict for the
purposes ofIHL implementation will probably be determined through practice,
rather than a fonnal decision by the international community in the abstract, although the latter should not be ruled out. It will probably also depend on the degree of damage that CNA causes (the more it creates, the more likely it will be
treated in the same way as an anned conflict). Perhaps even the tenn "anned"
conflict will one day start sounding as outdated as ''jus in bello!"

How the Existing Law of Armed Conflict Would Affect the Use of Computer
Network Attack
As indicated earlier, one can safely assert that the whole body ofIHL applies
to the use of CNA. Three areas of this law seem, however, particularly pertinent: the principle of distinction and all the rules that flow from it, the use of
ruses of war and the prohibition of perfidy, and whether the rules relating to
combatant status could be affected. In addition, some thought needs to be given
to the law of neutrality during anned conflict.

The Principle of Distinction
Whereas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries methods of warfare
meant that civilians were only directly affected by sieges and otherwise only indirectly by the general economic advantages or misfortunes caused by war, the
advent ofair and missile warfare in the 20th century brought the need for special
protection for civilians against attack to the fore. The principle ofdistinction has
therefore taken on an importance, and led to detailed treaty and customary law,
that goes well beyond the few rules articulated in the 1899 and 1907 Hague
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Conventions. Although heartily derided by the "realists," those persons who
strove to ban the dropping of bombs from the air6 were obviously far-seeing
people who realized the potential for massive destruction that this new method
represented. Even restrictions on air warfare were slow to come about, only being
accepted, in the form ofthe 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions,
once the potential military utility ofair warfare had been thoroughly eA-plored. 7
Although the form and probable effect of warfare is quite different, the same
pattern may be showing itselfin relation to CNA. Here is a new tool that in civilianlife opens up access to the world through rapidity and ease ofcommunication
in a way that has been heretofore unseen. Moreover, it allows technological development that could lead to all kinds to extraordinary steps in human development. One suggestion that has been made is to consider banning at least some
forms ofCNA;8 however, it has been rejected, probably because of the desire to
further explore CNA's military potential. As always, there are those who' argue
that "progress" cannot be stopped, that new means and methods of warfare are
inevitable, and that therefore there is really no point in trying to stop or regulate
anything. Others prefer to see which new methods are useful in that they are
more accurate, militarily more effective, do not cause unnecessary damage, and
are not more trouble than they are worth. Needless to say, IHL in general, and
the principle of distinction in particular, are based on the latter premise. It is
hoped that, unlike bombardment from the air, careful thought will be given to
CNA before launching into experimentation.
The principle of distinction involves a number ofrules that will be ofparticular relevance for CNA: (i) the evaluation that objects considered for attack are
indeed "military objectives" within the meaning ofIHL; (ii) the prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks; (iii) the need to minimize collateral damage and to abstain
from attacks ifsuch damage is likely to be disproportionate to the value of the military objective to be attacked; and (iv) the need to take the necessary precautions
to ensure that the above three rules are respected. From what is known at present, there are potential problems as regards all ofthese rules in relation to CNA.

Only Military Objectives May Be Attacked .
The definition ofmilitary objective contained in Additional Protocol 19 is not
only that accepted by the 155 States party to the treaty, but was also referred to as
being the appropriate one to use by the representatives of several major
non-party States at the recent diplomatic conference that adopted the Second
Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
of 1954. 10 In order for something to be a military objective, it must meet two
cumulative conditions: it must make an effective contribution to the military
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action of the adversary and, in the circumstances ruling at the time, its attack
must offer a definite military advantage to the attacker. It is clear that this definition does presuppose a plan to be followed with a view to achieving a particular
military result. It also presupposes a knowledge of what the adversary is using,
and how it is being used, for its military action. The terminology was chosen
carefully to prohibit certain behaviors of the Second World War, specifically, it
addressed the attack of persons and objects on the basis that they are
"quasi-combatants" or in one way or another help the "war effort." Such reasoning leads sooner or later to no restraints, for anything can be justified this way.
Indeed, it rapidly led to the United Kingdom deciding that "civilian morale"
was to be a targetl1 and, as a result, to the wholesale destruction of cities.
The specification that the object must effectively help the "military action" of
the adversary means that the link to the military operations must be a close and
obvious one. The reference to the "circumstances ruling at the time" requires
that the military advantage to the attacker be equally clear and obvious in the
context of the attacker's military plan to achieve the particular military aim.
During the negotiation of the Additional Protocols, this was considered to represent both economy of force and military professionalism, thereby leading to
the military result needed while moving away from generally attacking anything
in the hope that in due course the adversary would surrender. The decision not
to adopt a list of "military objectives" was part of the same reasoning. Any list
could either exclude something that in the circumstances could be of great importance in achieving the particular military mission, or alternatively include
things oflittle or no importance in the particular circumstances. It is for this reason that any "list" in a textbook or manual can never offer more than examples
ofwhat have at one point or another been considered to be military objectives in
past conflicts-they will not necessarily be so in any particular future one.
It is to be hoped that planning and precision will not be lost. Computer networks can easily be seen as "communications." Many manuals refer to "means of
communication" as typical military objectives--a simple reference to existing
lists could lead to the appalling result that any computer network used by the adversary State and its citizens could be attacked. Quite apart from the fact that this
would almost certainly hit protected objects, and in addition amount to an indiscriminate attack, it would not result from the necessary process ofevaluation described above. In order to amount to a military objective, either the piece of
network being affected or the object that the network is controlling must meet
the two conditions.
There could also be the temptation to try to totally remove the technological
framework which the whole ofsociety bases itself on (although this may well be
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technically impossible through CNA), on the reasoning that this would make
that society's life so generally unpleasant that surrender would surely follow.
The temptation is likely to be all the greater because military networks will
probably be better protected from hacking than a number of civilian networks.
It could also be asserted that this method would be more "humanitarian" than
sending bombs. It is clear that this reasoning is quite different from that underlying the Protocols, which stress choices of target for the specific desired military
goals. Is there a possibility that sophisticated military practice (which was the basis for the rules in the Protocols) will change? What would happen to the principle of distinction? An approach based on technological siege warfare would in
effect make it disappear, or at least radically change its characteristics. It could require that specially protected objects, e.g., hospitals, organize themselves so that
they are not within the normal computer network (if this were practicable) in
order to be protected. In effect, this would represent a return to the reasoning
behind the rules of Geneva Convention IV of 1949 12 and the Hague Convention of1954, 13 which rely on the concept ofthe creation ofvarious safe areas because they assumed that the practices of World War II would prove inevitable.
Such reasoning would amount to abandoning the approach of the Protocols and
present customary law, i.e., that all objects that are not military objectives are
safe from being deliberately targeted.
Careful thought should be given before going down the road of technological
siege warfare. Quite apart from the fact that it would be contrary to present customary and treaty law, the presumptions that such a practice would be based on
are dubious for at least two totally separate reasons. First, society is increasingly
becoming so dependent on modem technology that computer systems failure
for a lengthy period would not be just "unpleasant"-it could easily lead to mass
disease, starvation and other catastrophes14 (it is probable that such a scenario
could not be accomplished by CNA alone, but it may well be possible when undertaken in conjunction with other methods). On the other hand, and despite
the recent example, it would not necessarily lead to surrender in a short period of
time. Both reasons lead to the conclusion that surgical technological strikes, to
the degree that this is technically possible, would make more sense.

The Prohibition of Indiscriminate Attacks
Additional Protocol I defines indiscriminate attacks in Article 51 (4) .15 An attack is indiscriminate when it either is not carefully aimed at each military objective (through carelessness or use ofinappropriate weapons) or when its effects on
a military objective are uncontrollable and unpredictable (an obvious and
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uncontroversial example would be the use ofa bacteriological weapon against a
group of soldiers).
From what has been written so far on CNA, this appears to be potentially the
most serious problem, i.e., aiming accurately at what the intended target is and,
even if one manages to strike it with precision, not at the same time creating a
host of unforeseen and unforeseeable effects. 16
The Problem of Collateral Damage
The need to avoid, or at least minimize, damage to-civilians and civilian objects is reflected in Article 57(2) (a)(ii) of Pro to col I, which indicates that "those
who plan or decide upon an attack shall ... take all feasible precautions in the
choice ofmeans and methods ofattack with a view to avoiding, and in any event
to minimizing, incidental loss ofcivilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects." An attack only becomes in itselfillegal, however, ifit violates the
rule of proportionality, a long-standing rule of customary law. The wording
used in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I is "an attack which may be expected to
cause incidentallos-s of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated."
The evaluation as to whether likely civilian damage would be disproportionate has an inherent difficulty in that one is comparing two different things.
Whereas the need to avoid or at least minimize collateral injury is a straightforward rule relating to the choice ofmeans or methods that should be preferred, an
evaluation as to possible illegality is fraught with difficulty. A certain subjectivity
seems inevitable, but as an anticipated result could be illegal, there ought to be
some objective factors to follow. State practice in this regard is scant-just a few
examples have been given on when such attacks have been desisted from-and
they have usually been when either the possible target was something that was
military in nature but in the circumstances unusable or where the object's value
as a military objective could not be verified. 17 To complicate matters, certain
statements of understanding indicate that the attack is to be considered as a
whole when making the evaluation. 18 However, these statements should not be
interpreted as meaning proportionality of the civilian damage caused during the
entire campaign compared with military advantages obtained during a specific
attack. Such an interpretation is impossible because the only evaluation that
could be possible would be at the end of the conflict, whereas the rule requires
the evaluation to be done btifore the attack concerned. Proportionality evaluations pursuant to the jus in bello should also not be confused with proportionality
in self-defence, which is the jus ad bellum rule that requires the military action as a
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whole to be limited to what is necessary to restore one's territorial integrity.1 9
Rather, based on a number ofsources, the statements of understanding can only
be logically interpreted as referring to the fact that the military value ofattacking
an object (which has to be weighed against the likely civilian casualties) will obviously be assessed taking into account its role in the broader strategic purpose of
a particular military operation that may consist of various individual actions. 20
There could be, of course, a temptation to consider that whatever collateral
damage was caused by CNA, it would surely be proportional to the military advantage gained. This would be an abuse of the rule, as it requires a careful advance
evaluation of the likely effects on the civilians. If the likely effects are quite unclear and unforeseeable (which appears to be the technical situation at present),
the attack would be an indiscriminate one and therefore illegal as such-the rule
of proportionality would not even be relevant. 21

Precautions in Attack
It is obvious that in order to respect the rules relating to the principle of
distinction, a certain amount ofthought and planning is necessary. Such precautions are therefore nothing more than the e:l>.l'ression of a bona fide implementation of the law. 22 The advance evaluations indicated above are of particular
importance, but it also ought to be possible to call off an attack once it becomes
clear that what was thought to be a military objective is not one after all or ceases
to be one, or ifit becomes clear that the consequent collateral damage would be
excessive. 23 This would be particularly relevant in cases of CNA methods that
would not have an immediate effect on the target.
The other aspect of great importance, in order to evaluate military objective
or incidental damage, is that of sufficient intelligence information. The advantage of computer operations is that they can be conducted from the comparative
security of a computer terminal far from the actual military operations. Computer network e:l>.l'loitation (CNE) could help gain maximum information on
an adversary's situation, provided that such data is available on reachable networks and that the data is not itself deliberate misinformation. However, although it is a valuable tool for gaining intelligence and does not pose the risks of
physical presence, CNE cannot totally replace intelligence gathering by other
means, especially the most reliable one, direct observation. 24 CNE combined
with other intelligence sources could well provide for the possibility of good
precautions being taken in attack.
On the other hand, CNA conducted from a distance poses two particular
problems in relation to precautions in attack. First, if one suspects that one is the
object of such an attack, taking out the attacker is likely to prove to be very
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difficult because ofthe inunense difficulty ofbeing sure where the attack originated.
The likelihood, therefore, of attacking back in quite the wrong place is high.
Second, lack ofphysical presence near the object to be affected means that the
likelihood ofmaking mistakes as to whether something really is at that moment a
military objective is high. Protocol I speaks in terms of the attacker doing "ev-'
erything feasible" to verify that the target is a military objective. The word "feasible" clearly indicates that perfection is not expected. It is a matter of common
sense and good past military practice that commanders take into account the
need to reduce eX'P0sure of their own armed forces (an eliminated army cannot
win an armed conflict). However, it is only a recent practice that so much care is
given to avoiding any military casualties on one's own side, and one can see how
tempting CNA would be in such an endeavor. The law requiring precautions in
attack cannot be simply eliminated ifsuch precautions involve some physical risk
to the attacker. Although not articulated anywhere as such, when such a practice
means that there are many more civilian casualties than military, the concept of
the principle of distinction is badly battered, perhaps even turned on its head.
Once again, apart from amounting to a violation ofexisting law, such inaccuracy
gives rise to concern as to the effectiveness ofthe intended military operation.

Ruses of War and Perfidy
Computer data provides new avenues for practicing ruses of war. The more
CNE is undertaken, the more likely it is that misinformation will be deliberately
planted to confuse the adversary. Such misinformation about one's own affairs is
perfectly lawful, for it is analogous in principle to any other vehicle for misinformation. Moreover, it is clear from traditional sources that ruses of war need not
be limited to creating misinformation about onese1£25 However, it must also be
true that computer generated attacks cannot be undertaken whilst giving the impression that they come from the adversary's own side. This would be the equivalent to attacking while wearing the enemy's uniform, which is clearly illegal.26
As \vith all ruses of war, care must be taken that they do not cross the line into
perfidy. Therefore, misinformation implicating protected persons or objects
would be unlawful, as would CNE amounting to a breach of good faith, such as
pretending to surrender or to create a truce. 27

Combatants and CNA
It is most likely that CNA and CNE would be carried out by specialized personnel. What would be the legal situation of such persons? Could they be
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attacked by any means and in any place? What would be their status if captured?
There is probably no reason why the rules should be any different than in traditional armed conflict.
If incorporated into the armed forces, such personnel would have all the
rights and liabilities of combatants. Therefore, they certainly could be attacked
like any other combatant and should endeavor to be in uniform if captured. The
narrow exception in Article 44(3) of Protocol I (for those party to it), which
would allow POW status if captured without uniform, may well not apply to
such persons, as this provision is generally interpreted as applying only to combatants in occupied territory, and only then in certain situations. 28 Persons captured in the adversary's territory without uniform carrying out CNE would also
qualify as spies. If conducted from outside the territory, however, the situation
should be no different from someone gathering data from a spy satellite.
Technicians that act for the military, but are not part of it, pose more of a
problem. The persons listed in Article 4(4) of Geneva Convention III of 194929
are entided to prisoner ofwar status if captured, but the type ofpersons listed are
more analogous to computer technicians that keep the machines in order, and
not ones that actually undertake the attacks. It could well be, therefore, that persons who actually undertake CNA would be considered civilians who would
have no POW status if captured. They would also be subject to attack, as they
would be taking a "direct part in hostilities."3o Whether those undertaking
CNE are in exacdy the same situation is less clear, and this is because State practice is not consistent as to whether intelligence collection falls into the category
of taking a "direct" part in hostilities. However, there is no reason why gathering intelligence by this means should be treated any differendy from intelligence
gathering by other means. The possibility of being treated as a spy would only
occur ifthe CNE were carried out clandestinely in the territory of the adversary.
The Hague Regulations of 1907, in particular Article 21, do not exclude the
possibility that civilians could be spies for the purposes ofIHL, although Article
46 of Protocol I only refers to members of the armed forces. However, both
treaties conceptually indicate the need to be caught in the act in the territory
controlled by the adversary, although this is not the exact wording used. 31 However, if the civilian undertaking CNA or CNE is not "claimed" by the army using him, he could be simply treated as an individual breaking national law and
therefore be subject to criminal law should he be captured on return to the
country; the rule that he cannot be treated as a spy once he returns to his own
army would not apply and there is no reason why POW status would be considered either.
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The Effect on Neutral States
Although there are a number of discussions on whether there is a formal difference between "non-belligerent" and "neutral" States, and a resulting difference oflegal regime,32 this author believes that there is insufficient basis in State
practice to support such an assertion. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter,
all States not party to a conflict will be treated as "neutral."
As many networks link up and/or are owned by different countries or their
private citizens, and given that it is the general view that the effect of any CNA
might not be limited to the intended target, the law relating to neutral States is of
particular significance. The law of neutrality in cyberspace poses difficulties, beyond those of other aspects of IHL, because neutrality law has led to legal regimes that differ depending on the region of operations. Thus, there are
significant differences between the law applicable to land, sea (which is subdivided into different maritime areas), and outer space operations. It is not
self-evident what the regime should be in relation to cyberspace. To suggest that
it should vary depending on whether the data affected are supposed to be at any
particular moment in a country's territory, passing via a satellite, or being conducted through an underwater cable would create a factual and legal nightmare.
One could, ofcourse, simply wait to see what happens and deduce customary
law based on practice, rather like what initially happened in relation to the law of
outer space, which began to take shape when the first satellites were actually put
into orbit. However, this new area of activity did not escape formal regulation
through a series ofinternational instruments that began to be adopted after only a
few years, initially in the form of UN resolutions and later a number of treaties
which confirmed the practice that outer space and other planets could not be
acquired by any nation nor be used to base certain weapons. 33 Therefore, the
likelihood ofCNA being left entirely to practice without more formal intemationallegal regulation is somewhat slim. It would make sense at this stage to consider the kind of regime that would be appropriate, and, rather than be totally
inventive, see whether basic principles of the law of neutrality could provide
some answers.
The basic premise of the law of neutrality is that a neutral State should not,
through its actions, deliberately affect the outcome of armed conflict between
belligerents. In return, the neutral expects not to be drawn into the conflict. An
excellent description of the concept of neutrality and the basic rules that flow
from itis contained in Volume II of Oppenheim's International Law. Certain passages in this description remain offundamental importance. After indicating that
all States that are not drawn into the war are presumed neutral, it provides that:
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Since neutrality is an attitude of impartiality, it excludes such assistance and
succour to one of the belligerents as is detrimental to the other, and, further, such
injuries to the one as benefit the other. But it requires, on the other hand, active
measures from neutral States. For neutrals must prevent belligerents from making
use of their neutral territories, and of their resources, for military and naval
purposes during the war.... Further, neutrals must, by all means falling short of
becoming involved in hostilities or of abandoning their attitude of impartiality,
prevent each belligerent from interfering with their legitimate intercourse with
the other belligerent through commerce and the like, because a belligerent
cannot be e>""pected passively to suffer vital damage resulting to himself from the
violation by his enemy of a rule, which, while it operates directly in favour of
neutrals, indirectly operates in his favour as well.
The required attitude ofimpartiality is not incompatible \vith sympathy with one
belligerent, and disapproval of the other, as long as these feelings do not find
expression in actions violating impartiality.... Moreover, acts ofhumanity on the
part of neutrals and their subjects ... can never be construed as acts of partiality,
even if these comforts are provided for the wounded and the prisoners of one
belligerent only.34
The same thought is put across even more succincdy by Professor Leslie
Green:
So long as the activities of these non-participants do not interfere \vith the
legitimate activities of the belligerents or benefit one at the e>""pense of the other,
neutrals are entitled to have their territory and doings respected and unaffected
because of the conflict.35
These passages indicate the importance ofdistinguishing between, on the one
hand, the right of the neutral State to carry on its life, including conunerce with
belligerents, as normal, from, on the other hand, the prohibited behavior of
actively favoring the outcome of the war through State acts. This is also the reasoning, cited in Oppenheim, behind some of the more detailed rules, including
those that distinguish between State acts and the acts of a State's citizens:
International Law is primarily a law between States.... In the first instance,
neutral States are bound by certain duties of abstention, e.g., in respect of supply
ofloans and munitions to belligerents, which they are not bound to exact from
their nationals. Secondly, neutral States are under a duty to prevent their territory
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from becoming a theatre ofwar as the result ofpassage offoreign troops or aircraft
or ofprolonged stay ofbelligerent men-of-war in their territorial waters. Thirdly,
they are bound to control the activities of their nationals insofar as these may tend
to transform neutral territory into a basis ofwar operations or preparations. At the
same time, International Law renders unlawful certain activities of nationals of
neutral States, like carriage of contraband or breach of blockade, without,
however, imposing upon these States the duty to prevent or to penalise such acts.
These are punished by the belligerent against whom they are directed. 36

Oppenheim then recognizes the rather thin line between individual activity and State activity in regulated economies, but indicates that the rule still
exists. Although this text was published 48 years ago, practice has not really
changed significanciy, especially in the light of the precision given on export
licences:
From the case of actual governmental responsibility for the production of and
trade in certain articles there must be distinguished that of governmental control
over e,,-ports by the system oflicensing and the like. The fact that the Government
permits e"-port which it could prevent by means of withholding the licence does
not make it a party to the transaction. Its responsibility is engaged only when in
thus acting it discriminates between the opposing belligerents....
. . . Apart from certain restrictions necessitated by impartiality, all intercourse
between belligerents and neutrals takes place as before, a condition of peace
prevailing between them in spite of the war between the belligerents. This applies
particularly to the working oftreaties, to diplomatic intercourse, and to trade. 37

The same point is made by Professor Green:
A neutral does not have to forbid the supply ofwar materiel by resident individuals
or companies, nor is it required to stop the passage of such goods across its
territory. It is under no obligation to forbid the use of privately-owned
communication equipment on behalf of belligerents, but ifit limits the freedom
ofits nationals to provide such facilities this restriction must operate against all the
belligerents.38

This passage stresses the fact that neutral States have, for the most part, the
right to carry on life as normal. Their specific duties are relatively narrow,
concentrating primarily on preventing their territory from being used as a base
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of operations by one belligerent or the other. If they choose to grant specific
facilities (that must not direcdy concern military operations), they must be
granted to all the belligerents equally, e.g,. if the neutral allows one belligerent to
bring prizes to one of its ports, it must allow the other belligerent the same
rights. 39 Therefore, any negative effect of the war on the neutral State would be
indirect.
The specific rights of belligerents in relation to neutral merchantmen in this
context are more in the character ofan exception to the general rule than otherwise. They are based on the rather special combination ofbeing acts that are carried out against individuals, in an area that is not national territory, and stem
from very long and peculiar practice specific to naval warfare. Any analogy between computer networks and these special rules of neutrality relating to merchantmen on the high seas would be highly dubious; it would certainly not be
based on the general principles which for the most part allow neutral citizens to
carry on life as normal. State practice over the last 50 years is essentially consistent with this position. Arguments that most States are not really "neutral" because of the degree of relations that they and their citizens have \vith belligerents
appear to be founded on an exaggerated interpretation of the degree of restrictions and duties that such States are supposed to have. 4o Therefore, a belligerent
State would have to be very certain that a neutral State has indeed violated its duties of neutrality before considering self-help measures involving force to stop
the violation. Such a violation of the duty of neutrality by the State cannot be
easily asserted. In addition, the prohibition of the use offorce in Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter means that such a use of force by a belligerent could, if not
clearly lawful, be not only a breach ofthe law ofneutrality, but also a violation of
the UN Charter. 41
Returning specifically now to the question of computer networks, which
are for the most part owned by companies that are more or less subject to a limited degree of State regulation, basic principles of neutrality law would militate
in favor of their continuing to be used as normal, even if some States are in
an armed conflict with each other. The nearest equivalent to computer networks in existing neutrality law is reflected in Article 8 of Hague Convention V
of 1907:
A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the
belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus
belonging to it or to companies or private individuals.
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In so far as much of the computer network does indeed use telephone lines,
this provision is direcdy applicable. In other cases, both its implication and the
basic principles of neutrality law would support application of the same rule. As
fur as transmission via satellite is concerned, there is no reason why the rule
should be any different; freedom of the use of outer space in international law is
extensive and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty does not contain any specific provisions that would prevent the use of neutrally owned satellites by belligerents or
give the right to a belligerent to interfere with such satellites. Despite the indication in Article III that the use of outer space should be pacific, and in Article I
that it should be in the interests of all countries, the prohibitions that are clearly
enunciated are limited to weapons of mass destruction,42 and, at any rate, use
must be in conformity with internationallaw. 43 Without taking a stand on
whether any type of military use of satellites is in conformity with the letter or
spirit of the 1967 treaty, it contains nothing that would change the law of neutrality as such, nor, to this author's knowledge, has it been interpreted as having
done so. This brings us back to general neutrality law.
It would appear, therefore, that a breach of neutrality would only occur if a
neutral State specifically allowed a network to be built on its territory for the
purposes ofsupporting the armed conflict ofone or more belligerents or ifit specifically allowed a network to be devoted to this purpose, for doing so would be
the equivalent ofallowing its territory to become a base ofoperations. This conclusion mirrors Article 3 of Hague Convention V:
Belligerents are ... forbidden to
(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or other
apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or
sea;

(b) Use of any installation of this kind established by them before the war on the
territory ofa neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not been
opened for the service of public messages.

Article 5 of the same treaty indicates that neutral States must not allow any of
these acts to occur on its territory.
So much for the use ofcomputer networks by neutrals and belligerents. What
would be the case if a CNA was directed at a target in a belligerent country but
affected a neutral country. Ifsuch an effect was unforeseeable and unlikely, then
it would be purely accidental. However, if such an effect was probable or even
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possible, then the situation would not be the same. The law of neutrality is very
strict in its prohibition of any violation of neutral territory. As Article 1 of the
1907 Hague Convention V puts it, "the territory of neutral Powers is inviolable." The fact that military operations must not adversely affect neutral territory
is further reflected in the traditional rule that a blockade must not bar access to
the ports and coasts of neutral States. 44
State practice also indicates that all due precautions must be taken by
belligerents to avoid any, even collateral, damage to neutral States. During
the Second World War, US bombers unintentionally damaged a Swiss border
town on April 1, 1944. Not only did Switzerland protest, but the US government also recognized that due precautions had not been taken, formally
apologized for the incident, and prompdy paid four million dollars in reparations. The US then issued directives prohibiting bombings within 50 miles
of Switzerland. 45
Such a clear and strict approach means that a computer network attack that
could well have an adverse effect on neutral territory would be a violation ofinternationallaw.

Conclusions and Further Considerations on Possible Future Legal
Developments
It is clear that CNA could only be undertaken to the degree and in a fashion
that would respect existing law. Certain uses would probably be not only violations of the law of anned conflict, but also amount to war crimes, in which case
the individuals involved would be subject to punishment both at the national
and international levels within the context of applicable international law. It
should also not be forgotten that such breaches require payment of compensation, especially in the context ofinternational armed conflicts, where compensation is a long-standing requirement. 46 In addition, the trend towards requiring
reparation to be made to victims ofinternational crimes is reflected in Article 75
of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
In addition to these considerations, further steps deserve careful consideration. First, some thought needs to be given, after technical analysis, as to
whether certain types ofactions (for example, the introduction ofworm viruses)
would be inherendy indiscriminate. Ifso, in principle they would automatically
be illegal weapons47 and ought to be formally banned as such. This is probably
the reasoning behind part ofparagraph 3 of the draft Russian resolution (thatwas
presented to the First Committee of the 1998 General Assembly):
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II/vites all Member States to inform the Secretary-general of their views and
assessments concerning ... :
advisability of developing international legal regimes to prohibit the
development, production or use of particularly dangerous forms of information
weapons ... 48

This suggestion was not accepted by the United States which took the position that: "it is premature at this point to discuss negotiating an international
agreement on information warfare" and that "there seems to be no particularly
good reason for the United States to support negotiations for new treaty obligations in most of the areas of international law that are directly relevant to information operations."49 The resolution finally adopted,50 therefore, does not
contain this proposal, but this does not make such a suggestion any less valid.
Second, given that there does appear to be more support for the idea ofinternational cooperation to suppress unwelcome private actions,51 there may well
be a move towards creating universal jurisdiction for the punishment of certain
hackers, either on the basis of permissive universal jurisdiction (based on the
model of the customary law relating to piracy and most war crimes), or of compulsory universal jurisdiction (such as that created by treaty for grave breaches,
torture, and certain types of terrorist acts). Even ifuniversal jurisdiction as such is
not created, it is likely that there will be arrangements to facilitate the extradition
and punishment of such offenders.
Finally, a careful policy evaluation ought to be made as to the advantages and
disadvantages of embarking on computer network attacks. On the one hand, if
military advantages can be gained through this method which not only respect
existing law but also reduce physical damage and casualties, then this would be a
definite "plus." On the other hand, computer network attacks do have the potential to seriously mess up a wonderful new human achievement. In this regard,
the most technologically advanced societies would be the most at risk. These
anxieties are clearly reflected in the preambular paragraphs of the two General
Assembly resolutions adopted in 1998 and 1999, which are virtually identical. 52
The operative paragraphs in effect only call on States to think about existing
threats and what could be done about them, in particular the "Advisability ofdeveloping international principles that would enhance the security of global information and telecommunications systems and help to combat information
terrorism and criminality."53 The fact that military applications are possible is
recognized in the first preambular paragraph which does not exclude as such this
use but goes on the say that it is important to maintain and encourage civilian
use. The policy question remains, therefore, "is CNA worth it?" Or would it be
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more intelligent to outlaw this fonn of warfare before serious damage begins? It
is hoped that we will not just "wait and see!"
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* This chapter reflects the personal views ofthe author and in no way engages the responsibility
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law of war.
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32. Discussions on this issue took place during one of the meetings of e"-perts (Geneva 1993)
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Archives). Both reach the conclusion that there is no such legal difference and the Manual treats
equally all States not taking part in the conflict as "neutral." Reference is also made to this idea, but
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more restrictive than the traditional right of self-help in such a circumstance.
42. Art. IV.
43. Art. III.

184

Louise Doswald~Beck
44. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 32, para. 99, which reflects art. 18 of the 1909 London
Declaration. During the drafting ofthe San Remo Manual, this provision was totally uncontested.
45.J. Helmreich, T1Ie Diplomacy ojApology-U.S. Bombings oJSwitzerland during World War II,
AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW, May-June 1977, at 20,21-23. The letter of apology, dated 4 April
1944, issued by the US Embassy in Berne, contained the following:
Le profond regret de tous les Americains pour Ie tragique bombardment par les bombardiers
americains de la ville suisse de Schaffhouse Ie ler avril ... un groupe de bombardiers .. .
n' ont pas pris les larges precautions prevues pour eviter des incidents de ce genre .... Le
Secretaire de la Guerre ... a demande en meme temps au Secretaire d'Etat d'assurervotre
Gouvernement que toutes precautions seront prises pour prevenir autant qu'il est
humainement possible la repetition de pareil malheureux accident.
15 DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES SUISSES 1848-1945, at 315.
46. 1907 Hague Convention IV, art. 3, repeated in Additional Protocol I, art. 91.
47. See, e.g., the articulation ofbasic rules ofIHL in the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court ofJustice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 95,July 8, 1996:
"Thus, methods or means ofwarfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and
military targets ... are prohibited."
48. Draft Resolution, supra note 7.
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50. G.A. Res. 53170 Oan. 4, 1999), Developments in the field of information and
telecommunications in the context of international security, UN Doc. A/RES/53170.
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technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes." This provision is repeated in a resolution of the
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